explore its self-presentation as a secular religion. The claim that fascism had a coherent ideology need not be incompatible with this exploration.8 Finally, the denial that fascism had reactionary elements makes no sense in the Italian case where such elements played an important part in its intellectual culture. Such a denial also ignores the role that reactionary thinking like that of Joseph De Maistre played, not only for fascism but for the cultural avantgarde tradition of Baudelaire and Flaubert that ultimately underlay the proto-fascist avant-gardes in Italy. 9 In one sense, however, both views of the origins of fascist culture are too simple. One cannot merely regard fascist culture as emerging within fixed political and intellectual fields.10 Not only did those intellectuals both in and outside the regime who wished to construct and realize a new fascist form of civilization need to readjust their views continually according to what Mussolini was saying and how the masses were or were not responding to the construction of a fascist culture, but new historical forces also appeared on the horizon which crystallized into positions that profoundly altered the terms of debate. One very important example of this was the ascendance of American power and its consumer culture in the 1920s, a force that entered Italian cultural debate under the rubric of americanismo.11
Prior to 1926 when americanismo began to be debated in a major way, the fascist quest for a more spiritual culture could be juxtaposed to a variety of images, especially the liberal Italy of bourgeois affarismo and corrupt trasformismo, and the Bolshevik Revolution, grounded in dialectical materialism and atheism and focused on crude material goals. It could also be developed positively in relation to the culture of the trenches and the masculinist camaraderie of squadrismo and the March on Rome. In each of these images, which were central to the period of the early fascist movement, fascism could present itself as a progressive alternative to the status quo. But when the spectre of a trans-Atlantic invasion of Americanism arose, fascist intellectuals were thrust on the defensive, and it brought out their more reactionary associations with the nationalist imagery of Catholicism, the Roman Empire and the Italian 'paese'. For them, Italy had been brought under attack by an insidious force that threatened the very essence of the Italian way of life (italianita), an attack that gave new meaning to the 'revolt against materialism'.
I want now to turn to one of the groups of Guillaume Apollinaire had contributed to them. These journals were committed to the view that avant-garde culture could blaze the way to a spiritual renewal, and they had promoted the myth of a great war as the means of overturning liberal, bourgeois Italy and replacing it with a new modernist culture of their own design. The realities of the first world war, however, had doused these dreams with an ice-cold alpine shower. When Soffici and his friends returned from the front in 1918, the institutions of the prewar avant-garde were dead, the sense of political crisis in Italy was so great as to create not simply the hope but the expectation of an impending system change in politics, and the threat of Bolshevism in Italy loomed large. 15 In this atmosphere, the lacerbiani soon subsumed their earlier enthusiasms in the new fascist movement. Fascism, they now hoped, could realize the modernist spiritual revolution through a genuine mass movement that would assume political power. Yet this implied an aesthetic politics based on nationalism rather than the internationalism of their pre-war days, and that in turn suggested that artistic experimentalism should give way to the communal celebration of Italy's artistic heritage and to a restoration of classical aesthetic values. Soffici, especially, wrote harsh words against those who continued to pursue an avant-gardism of the pre-war sort, 'tumbling among their "dadas" as we stop to build our own house'. 16 In aesthetics, then, the lacerbiani renounced their old allegiances in favour of a 'return to order', an 'italianismo artistico', and a recognition that in negating classical principles they had lost their cultural bearings.17 Yet, if the content of their aesthetic changed, their sense of the need for spiritual renewal that had driven their pre-war modernism was actually heightened. Rosai, Maccari and Malaparte were avid participants in the Tuscan squadrismo of 1920-2, and all of the other selvaggi-to-be favoured the spirit of squadrismo against the normalizing and bureaucratizing tendencies that would become apparent soon after the establishment of the new fascist regime. For them, squadrista violence, which had its origins in the first world war in the sense that many of its leaders were ex-officers, was, like the war, the group celebration of the Italian 'warrior spirit' and 'revolutionary soul', the pathway to a newly vital and spiritually replenished nation. It was also at the heart of what Tuscan avant-gardism had become.
The The culprit was 'the Americanism that is being diffused in Europe, which after having ruined Germany, pushing it to the point of collapse, is now contaminating England, France, and almost every nation on our continent'.27
To focus on a personalized enemy, often one with stereotyped attributes suitable for scapegoating, was characteristic not only of II Selvaggio but of the tradition of Tuscan avant-garde rhetoric that went back to Leonardo. Yet such personalization often gave the enemy a false concreteness, and it is difficult to isolate precisely what the Americanism Soffici began to perceive in 1926 meant to him. In the article just cited, he first associates it with 'the contaminating force of modern plutocracy' that is reducing the European nations to 'prostitutes', a characterization that would seem to identify the enemy with the modern American corporation and perhaps the American government. Yet in the next sentence he writes that 'Americanism is the plague that spreads, vulgarizing the world, rendering it stupid, bestializing it, humiliating and destroying high, luminous, glorious, millenial civilizations' -an image that suggests something more generally cultural as its object. But the earth-bound, plastic art he created had been replaced by a 'metaphysical' art created by individuals cut loose from their natural moorings and anxiously in search of some new equilibrium. This northern spirit fostered a kind of titanic madness that tried to overcome its sense of unease by accenting the fantastic, the unexpected and the monstrous. The implication was that the spirit of romanticism and decadence that characterized European culture in the nineteenth century, and even up to the present, had its origins in the era of Luther and the Baroque culture that followed.
If a new Italian fascist civilization was to be created, it would have to break free from this northern cultural hegemony and recultivate its own historic values -spiritual, moral and aesthetic.
Soffici incorporates this argument and draws from it the same conclusion, but, in so doing, he necessarily creates a more complex conceptual network. The problem of fascist civilization has now become twofold. Fascism must redefine modernity in relation to classical Italian values once hegemonic in Europe but eclipsed for nearly four centuries by a rival set based in the Protestant north. But it must also withstand the new challenge of Americanism assaulting all of 'old Europe'. Even though this Americanism is understood at least in part as an extension of post-Reformation European culture, and thus as interconnected with the first problem, there are now two relatively distinct challenges to be faced. Culture must be redefined against the spirit of Romanticism and decadentism associated with northern Europe, and it must then be kept free from contamination by the power and attraction of American money and material values.
Let us first consider some aspects of the latter challenge and then turn back to the former. At the most basic level, Americanism is a challenge to Italian national autonomy. Thus America's domination of international finance is connected in the minds of the selvaggi with its desire to 'disarm Europe' and, thus, in effect to conquer her.30 Americanism is also a challenge to Italian cultural autonomy since, unfortunately but undeniably, it is attractive to the Italian masses. 'America descends to the sound of dollars, with its black idols, the cocktail, jazz, fashion, the imbecility and dazzling glitter of a civilization that is all sea-foam and no land, all machine and no heart', writes Orco Bisorco. 'Am I American enough?', he continues. 'That is the secret question that pushes young people to look fashionable at every moment and occasion of their day. ' Italy for me is superior to all other nations also for this reason, that it is the melting-pot of various races, from the German to the Arab, from the Illyrian to the Gallic, from the Norman to the Greek, and it takes the best from each one, in this way forming a synthesis that represents the perfection of the European type -I might even say, of the human type.37
The statement is at once a defence against being crudely racist He acknowledged some more recent 'woes' but saw 'undeniable nobility, warmth, and awareness characterizing the development of the young Italian art of this period, which will therefore be fascist art'. Overall, the balance sheet on the past five years of Italian life was favourable. The only forces actively arrayed against 'the rural idea' were a 'rotten aestheticism, a gloomy anti-Catholic philosophism, masonism, and so-called "pagan imperialism". If Italy is healthy, if it still has elements of vitality in its heart, it will know how to free itself from these cancerous humours and expel them.' Still, the 'ifs' in this assessment would prove prescient. In its final phase, II Selvaggio would become embittered and increasingly isolated. On one front the selvaggi fought against the 'rationalist' architecture they associated with Marcello Piacentini and Giuseppe Pagano, fascists also, but far too influenced by american-ismo.53 On another, they worried intensely about how to make their movement more attractive to youth, whom they perceived as increasingly restless and disillusioned with the regime.54 They debated a fascist corporatism as a possible solution to this problem but could not agree on how to conceive or implement it.55 On yet another front they became paranoiac about their aestheticist and modernist rivals.56 Their Catholicism became deeper and darker. 'Modern man', wrote Piero Bargellini, 'is a Job in reverse: he is full of sin and a dung heap lies inside him; but out of all his ulcers flows the juice of his justification.'57 They recoiled in horror at the advance of Hollywood cinema, which they labelled 'public enemy number one'.58 And finally, traces of apocalypticism became increasingly evident in their writings. In one such piece, Pellizzi predicted that even as the second world war was not yet concluded in 1944, there would arise from 'all the most civilized nations of the world, on a scale never before witnessed, the phenomenon of "return to the earth" '. 59 Having begun with the belief that its ideals were already realized in squadrista violence, by the mid-1930s II Selvaggio had arrived at the despairing conclusion that its ideals could only be realized as the result of some future world conflagration. Between these two points, the selvaggi had moved through three quite different phases. Yet these phases have little to do with changes in core beliefs -their strapaese ideology was continuous even if the word was coined only in 1926 -and a great deal to do with changes in the overall Italian political and intellectual fields. Initially, I/ Selvaggio was a 'radical' journal of squadrismo; it sought to push fascism in a non-normalizing direction at a time when the regime was young and the vistas of possibility relatively open. But, even if Mussolini had embraced such a position in the best of all fascist worlds, he was too mindful of the ultimate weakness in his own support, and he skilfully used Farinacci both to placate the radicals and, ultimately, to deliver a sacrificial lamb to his wealthier and more conservative backers. This move pushed the selvaggi in a less directly political direction; they had little choice but to accept and even applaud Mussolini's verdict.
So they turned to the big issues about what a fascist civilization could be. And they became aware of how imperilled it was in the new international context of the 1920s, so different from the first two decades of the century. Then they had faced off primarily against their own fledgling and self-doubting bourgeoisie; now they saw that fascism was up against a powerful international force, a materialist juggernaut with new industrial, marketing, and cultural techniques that, in toto, were nearly irresistible to modern mass societies, including their own. To this they responded with great indignation and fervent posturing about the efficacy of their own counter-ideals drawn from the rich resources of the Italian national and cultural tradition. And, though thrust on the defensive, for three years in Florence they succeeded in convincing themselves that they were still leading a 'revolution' towards a new form of modernity, one that would express the power of Italian Renaissance society transferred to modern terrain rather than of its northern, Protestant challenger. But when economic times turned gloomy and Mussolini's embrace of conservatism became so obvious as to shatter any and all illusions that there was any 'revolution' or 'new civilization' arising out of Italy, they retreated into depths of self-doubt. In this context their fascism became a single-mindedly reactionary onslaught against all those new cultural forms associated with the reigning northern and Americanist modernity, despite their increasing recognition that Italy had little or nothing with which to replace it.
Notes

